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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ryle (1949, Chapter V) discusses a range of predicates which in different ways 
exemplify a property I shall call quasi-duality – they appear to report two actions or 
events in one predicate. Although Ryle's concerns were not temporal or aspectual, 
his discussion is recognized as a seminal contribution to the development of 
theories of aktionsart. In particular, his term achievement is adopted by Vendler for 
the class of momentary events. 
 
This paper examines a number of quasi-dual predicates which are not generally 
discussed in the aktionsart literature, including break a promise, miscount, and cure 
the patient. Two types of quasi-dual predicates are identified and dubbed criterion 
predicates and causative upshot predicates. It is shown that both types of quasi-
dual predicate lack process progressives, despite being durative, and it is argued 
that the lack of process progressives identifies these predicates as (aspectual) 
achievements. They are termed durative achievements to distinguish them from 
canonical, momentary achievements. It is argued that a criterion predicate has the 
aspect of an achievement because it expresses an individual-level property 
predication on the event argument, and this is incompatible with a process 
progressive, which is stage-level for the event. Causative upshot predicates are 
argued to be lexically non-distributive, in contrast to accomplishments, which they 
otherwise resemble. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: 
Ryle's discussion of quasi-duality and the development of the currently used, 
Vendlerian class of achievements are reviewed in section 2. My classifications of 
criterion predicates and causative upshot predicates are introduced in section 3, 
where I name the quasi-dual parts of the denoted eventuality hosts and parasites. 
The relation between host events and parasite events is explored further in section 
4. Section 5 reviews the relevant tests for aktionsart, preparatory to discussion of 
the aspectual characteristics of quasi-duals in section 6. Stage-level and individual-
level predication are reviewed in section 7, where I argue that criterion predicates 
express an individual-level property of the event argument. This individual-level 
predication is incompatible with the process progressive, which is stage-level for 
the event argument. In section 8 I compare accomplishments and causative upshot 
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predicates, and argue that the lack of a process progressive with causative upshot 
predicates reveals lexical non-distributivity, associated with the '(un)lucky' meaning 
component or upshot identified by Ryle – (un)lucky upshots are contrasted with the 
culminations of accomplishments. Concluding remarks follow section 8. 
 
 
2.  BACKGROUND: RYLE, KENNY AND VENDLER 
 
The term achievement as the name of a Vendlerian aspectual class is originally 
taken from Ryle (1949), though Ryle's classification of predicates is not obviously 
temporal or aspectual. Achievements as Ryle identifies them are temporally varied, 
including but not confined to momentaneous events: "The thimble is found, the 
opponent checkmated, or the race won, at a specifiable instant; but the secret may 
be kept, the enemy held at bay, or the lead be retained, throughout a long span of 
time" (p. 143). 
 
Ryle's chief purpose was to review predicates which, in various ways, purport to 
denote two actions or events occurring together, and to argue that it is wrong "to 
postulate certain mysterious actions and reactions to correspond to certain familiar 
biographical episodic words" (p. 147). I shall use the term quasi-duality for the 
property Ryle discusses. 
 
Ryle explores a number of different kinds of quasi-dual predicates. The term 
achievement is introduced in the passage below (p. 125), applied to quasi-dual 
predicates with a 'lucky' or 'unlucky' character, or in other words, with a success or 
failure component. 
 
Many of the performance-verbs ... signify the occurrence not just of actions 
but of suitable or correct actions. They signify achievements. Verbs like 
'spell', 'catch', 'solve', 'find', 'win', 'cure', 'score', 'deceive', 'persuade', 'arrive', 
and countless others, signify not merely that some performance has been gone 
through, but also that something has been brought off by the agent going 
through it. ... We also use corresponding verbs of failure, like 'miss', 
'misspell', 'drop', 'lose', 'foozle', and 'miscalculate'. 
 
Obey (p. 138-40) is described as having a component of prior learning and 
intention, notice (p. 130), among others, is described as having a component of 
'heed' or 'minding', and migrate as having an extra component of fulfilling a natural 
law (p. 136-7): 
 
The two statements 'the bird is flying south' and 'the bird is migrating' are 
both episodic reports. The question 'Why is the bird flying south?' could be 
answered quite properly by saying 'Because it is migrating'. Yet the process 
of migrating is not a different process from that of flying south; so it is not 
the cause of the bird's flying south. ... We must say that 'it is migrating' 
describes a flying process in terms which are partly anecdotal, but are also 
partly predictive and explanatory. It does not state a law, but it describes an 
event in terms which are law-impregnated. 
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The success component of achievements is also described as an upshot (p. 144): 
"When a person is described as having fought and won, or as having journeyed and 
arrived, he is not being said to have done two things, but to have done one thing 
with a certain upshot." On page 143 Ryle defines achievements primarily in terms 
of quasi-duality: "One big difference between the logical force of a task verb and 
that of a corresponding achievement verb is that in applying an achievement verb 
we are asserting that some state of affairs obtains over and above that which 
consists in the performance, if any, of the subservient task activity."  
 
Overall, the key property of interest to Ryle is quasi-duality, and the different kinds 
of quasi-dual predicates he discusses, including his achievements, primarily 
illustrate this central idea.2 
 
Kenny (1963, Chapter 8) introduced temporal criteria with his observations 
concerning aspectual morphology and different verb classes, drawing on Aristotle. 
Kenny's temporal classes are not explicitly developments of Ryle's types, but 
correlations are signalled. Kenny's term performance for bounded events is taken 
from Ryle, Kenny's activities are Ryle's task verbs, and Ryle's achievements fall 
into all three of Kenny's classes, states, performances and activities (p. 185, fn. 1). 
 
Vendler (1967, Chapter 4) gives the first explicitly temporal descriptions of event 
types, his processes, accomplishments, achievements and states: "running, writing, 
and the like are processes going on in time ... they consist of successive stages 
following one another in time" (p. 99); "running a mile or writing a letter ... also go 
on in time, but they proceed towards a terminus which is logically necessary to 
their being what they are" (p. 101); "achievements occur at a single moment, while 
states last for a period of time" (p. 103). Here Vendler introduces the focus on 
achievements as momentary events, including Ryle's momentary quasi-duals, but 
excluding non-momentary quasi-duals. 
 
I shall argue in this paper that, although Ryle's intention was not to classify 
predicates in aspectual terms, nevertheless the quasi-dual structure he draws 
attention to has an aspectual dimension.  Other quasi-dual predicates, in addition to 
the canonical, momentary achievements such as notice and arrive, may also be 
classed as achievements on aspectual grounds. The two kinds of quasi-dual 
predicates I consider are introduced in the next section. 
 
 
3. CRITERION PREDICATES AND CAUSATIVE UPSHOT PREDICATES 
 
I shall call the predicates of interest in this paper criterion predicates and 
causative upshot predicates. Under criterion predicates I include Ryle's score a 
goal, prove the theorem and solve the problem. The key notion here is that there is 
some conventional criterion an action must meet in order to qualify as being an 
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event of the criterion-matching kind. The action's matching or satisfying the 
criterion is the upshot. For example, to score a goal one must kick the ball over the 
goalpost, in accordance with the rules of the game and while one is a player in a 
game. Given those circumstances, the kicking of the ball over the post constitutes 
the scoring of a goal. Without those circumstances, it is simply kicking the ball 
over the post.3 
 
Criterion-matching is also characteristic of obey. When a soldier obeys an order by 
fixing his bayonet, in addition to the obedient intent Ryle comments on, it is also 
necessary that the order stipulates bayonet-fixing. Given that the order stipulates 
bayonet-fixing, the fixing of the bayonet as a whole constitutes the obeying of the 
order. Further predicates in this group (not discussed by Ryle) are fulfil their 
expectations, break a promise, break a law, break a record, identified by Bennett 
(1994, p. 40) as 'proposition matches', and others such as make a mistake.  
 
Causative upshots are predicates such as cure the patient and convince. They are 
transitive, in contrast to the other upshots, in that the upshot consists of a change of 
state in an entity other than the actor.  
 
For ease of discussion, I shall term the basic action for both types of predicate (kick 
the ball over the post, fix the bayonet) the host event, and the extra component of 
upshot, criterion-matching or effect (score a goal, obey the order) the parasite 
event.  
 
The next section reviews hosts and parasites in more detail. In section 4.1 I claim 
that the host-parasite relation is expressed by the interpretive progressive, and 
section 4.2 comments on the similarity between criterion predicates and illocutions, 
and causative upshot predicates and perlocutions. The issue of whether the host is 
an event or a fact is addressed in section 4.3. 
 
 
4. HOSTS AND PARASITES.  
 
4.1 The interpretive progressive 
 
The relationship of a parasite to its host is very like the re-description of an 
event identified by König (1980) in his discussion of what he terms (after 
Buyssens (1968) the interpretive progressive, underlined in the examples 
below. Examples (1a-c) are taken from König. 
 
(1) a. If I should go to one of the tea-parties in a dressing gown and  
  slippers, I should be insulting society, and eating peas with my  
  knife.   (Jespersen 1954, p. 12.8) 
 b. If we choose to place the dividing line between the two at the  
  county line, then we are basing our decision on social rather  
  than linguistic facts. (Trudgill 1974, p. 15) 
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 c. A pupil, a proof-reader and an oculist's patient might all be told  
  to read carefully a certain paragraph: the pupil will be  
  disobeying his instructions, if he notices the misprints but not  
  the arguments.  (Ryle 1963, p. 137) 
 d. In saying these things he was warning you.   (Austin 1962) 
 e. When a person is described as having fought and won, or as  
  having journeyed and arrived, he is not being said to have done  
  two things, but to have done one thing with a certain upshot ... 
     (Ryle 1963, p. 144) 
 
König argues that this use of the progressive does not have the 'temporal 
frame' reading described by Jespersen (1932, p. 178-80), analysed by Dowty 
(1977), Bennett and Partee (1978), and others. Rather, a predicate in the 
interpretive progressive gives a redescription of an event which is 
independently reported, usually in the preceding clause. Here the interpretive 
progressive is context-dependent, in that it does not introduce its own 
reference time, but must be evaluated at the time given by the event which is 
redescribed – the interpretive progressive "simply specifies that the sentence 
in which it occurs must be evaluated at the same interval as the 'preceding' 
sentence" ( p. 287). 
 
König's main point is that the progressive is dependent on a contextually given 
time, and that the interpretive use provides evidence for this. His claim 
concerning the context-dependence of the progressive applies to all uses, 
including the 'temporal frame' or 'in progress' sense, and he does not contrast 
the interpretive progressive and the 'in progress' reading. The examples in (2) 
with canonical momentaneous achievements show that these contrast quite 
sharply, supporting the identification of the interpretive progressive as a 
distinct sense. Although examples (2a,c) are pragmatically odd, in that the 
redescription format must be interpreted as providing a gloss for the meaning 
of a common expression ( find, see the joke), (2a,c) are more acceptable than 
(2b,d), which show the familiar clash between an 'in progress' progressive and 
a momentaneous event.  
 
(2) a. In suddenly uncovering and seeing the key he was looking for, 
he was finding it. 
 b.   # He was finding the key when the door slammed. 
 c. In understanding the humorous nature of his remark she was 
getting the joke. 
 d.   # She was getting the joke when the doorbell rang. 
 
The interpretive progressive, then, (i) is a distinct sense from the 'in progress' 
progressive; (ii) expresses a redescription of a single given event, comparable 
to a parasite on a given host; and (iii) is compatible with canonical 
achievements (modulo the plausibility of a 'more basic' description of such an 
event as getting the joke). 
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4.2 Comparison with illocutions and perlocutions 
 
König points out that the interpretive progressive appears in the frame typical 
of illocutionary acts in Austin (1962), as shown in (1d) above. The 
interpretive progressive is the Y progressive in the frame In saying X he was 
Ying or In Xing he was Ying.  
 
Ryle's quasi-duals such as 'kick and score' and König's 'preceding' sentence 
combined with an interpretive progressive clause, share the characteristic that 
the two expressions involved in each case give different predications on what 
is taken to be a single event or act. The general notion of host and parasite 
subsumes these relations. Applying the notion to Austin's speech acts, a 
locutionary act can be associated with two kinds of parasite, an illocutionary 
act as in (1d) above and also a perlocutionary act. Roughly, a perlocutionary 
act produces a certain effect or consequence, which may be the achievement 
of the perlocutionary object lexicalized in such perlocutionary verbs as 
convince, persuade, console, and the like, or some other caused sequel. An 
illocutionary act, on the other hand, need only have a particular 
communicative force or character by convention, and need not produce any 
effect in the hearer apart from the hearer's recognition of the illocutionary 
force. 
 
Comparing illocutions and perlocutions, Austin contrasts the in frame with the 
by locution. In frames, associated with illocutionary acts (such as urge) and by 
frames, associated with perlocutionary acts (such as induce) are illustrated 
below. 
 
(3) a. In saying this he was urging her to leave. 
 b.    ? In saying this he urged her to leave. 
 c.    ? By saying this he was urging her to leave. 
 d.    ? By saying this he urged her to leave. 
 
 e.    ? In saying this he was inducing her to leave. 
 f.     ? In saying this he induced her to leave. 
 g.    ? By saying this he was inducing her to leave. 
 h. By saying this he induced her to leave. 
 
The '?' judgements shown here do not signify clear ill-formedness or anomaly, 
but indicate only that the unmarked form in each group is preferable to the 
others. The differences are slight. As Austin comments, "At most it might be 
claimed that the formula ['in saying x you were y-ing'] will not suit the 
perlocutionary act, while the 'by' formula will not suit the illocutionary act" (p. 
124). The general property expressed in the in frame, that the host simply 
realizes the parasite, is shared by illocutionary acts and criterion predicates, 
which appear most naturally in the in frame. A perlocution is partly realized 
by its host locution, but requires in addition an effect to be produced. 
Causative upshots share the extra effect component and are more compatible 
with the by locution. Although illocutionary and perlocutionary verbs are not 
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addressed in this study, related uses of the in and by frames will be used in 
presenting the data below. The frames are not used here as diagnostics. 
 
 
4.3 Is the host an event or a fact? 
 
As noted in section 3 above, my criterion predicates are generally the same as the 
propositional matches in Bennett's (1994) analysis of the by locution. Bennett 
argues that what satisfies the criterion in a predicate such as break a promise is not 
an event or action, but a fact. For example, He broke a promise by coming home 
late is analysed as "Some fact about his behaviour conflicted with a promise he had 
made earlier – namely the fact that – he came home late" (p. 36). Explicitly, what I 
have described as the host event corresponds to the fact that he came home late. 
 
Every event comes with its cloud of attendant facts, and so for every event there is 
reporting in terms of events as well as reporting in terms of facts. Although facts 
and events can be difficult to distinguish, one difference between them that I 
assume is that events are subject to some redescription but facts are narrowly 
specified. For example, if Jones came home late, the event of Jones coming home is 
the event of him coming home late, but the fact that he came home is not the same 
as the fact that he came home late. 
 
This distinction is relevant to the difference between whether a criterion is matched 
or not and the grounds for doing so. Suppose that Jones as a former MP is entitled 
to cheap air travel. The fact that he is a former MP is the grounds for his being so 
entitled, but the entitlement rests with him, not with the fact – the fact is not entitled 
to cheap air travel. Correspondingly, whether or not an event matches a criterion 
depends on, but is not the same as, the grounds for matching. In the data below, the 
criterion relationship expressed in the in frame is somewhat tolerant of 
redescription, which supports an event-based analysis. 
 
(4) a. Jones promised not to recite a limerick. 
 b. Jones promised not to recite the limerick about the bishop. 
 c. Jones promised not to recite anything. 
 d. Jones recited the limerick about the bishop. 
 e. In reciting a limerick Jones was breaking his promise. 
 f. In reciting a certain limerick Jones was breaking his promise. 
g. In reciting the limerick about the bishop Jones was breaking his 
promise. 
h. The fact that Jones recited a limerick ≠ the fact that Jones recited the 
limerick about the bishop ≠ the fact that Jones recited something. 
 
Take (4d) to be true. Assuming either (4a) or (4c) to be true, (4e-g) are all true. 
Taking (4b) to be true, (4g) is obviously true, (4e) is odd because a limerick in this 
sentence doesn't easily have the required specific reading, but (4f) is true.4 In short, 
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clause. In reciting a limerick Jones was breaking his promise, with a limerick on the non-specific 
reading, implicates that the promise did not specify the banned action in more detail, and recite a 
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sentences such as (4e-g) report that a reciting event satisfied a criterion, but need 
not state which fact about that event constituted the grounds for the match. I 
conclude that the host is an event. 
 
 
4.4 Redescription and temporal properties 
 
In what follows, I take as a departure point König's proposal that the 
interpretive progressive in the in frame maps the redescriptive predicate ( the 
parasite) to the interval of the redescribed event (the host). Recall that the in 
frame with the interpretive progressive correlates with Austin's illocutions and 
my criterion predicates – the parasite event is realized simply in the 
occurrence of the host event. Accordingly, the host and  the criterion parasite 
occur at the same interval. 
 
The by locution does not contain the interpretive progressive, and in fact a 
perlocution or causative upshot need not occupy the same interval as the host 
event, because the effect may be delayed – for example, Jones may urge 
Harris to a course of action, and Harris on mulling the matter over may 
become convinced long after the conversation ends. However, the effect may 
arise gradually over the interval of the host, and in such a case the host and 
causative upshot share an interval, or largely overlap. Causative upshots of 
this kind are to be considered here. So generally, for the examples to be 
considered below, the interval of occurrence for both host and parasite are 
either the same interval or largely overlapping.  
 
Despite the complete or partial temporal overlap, I shall argue that some 
parasites do not occupy the interval which is shared with the host in the same 
way that the host does, having a different aktionsart. Preparatory to presenting 
the data, the next section reviews the signs of aktionsart relevant to this 
discussion. 
 
 
5. SIGNS OF AKTIONSART 
 
The two main issues I wish to pursue in the way an event occupies its interval 
are duration and process.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
limerick is the most informative description of the event in its promise-breaking guise. The use of a 
certain limerick cancels this implicature, but does not go so far as matching the content of the 
grounds. The same consideration applies to 'He broke his promise by coming home late'. 
 
(i) He promised to be home at 5.00, and came home at 9.00. 
(ii) In coming home at 9.00 he broke his promise. 
(iii) In coming home late he broke his promise. 
(iv) In coming home after 5.00 he broke his promise. 
(v) In not coming home at 5.00 he broke his promise. 
(vi) In coming home after 7.00 he broke his promise. 
Assuming that (i) is true, (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are all true and appropriate, but (vi) is odd because it 
implicates that the time named is the threshold for the match. 
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5.1 Duration 
 
In commonly used diagnostic frames (see Vendler 1967, p. 100-1; Dowty 1979, p. 
56-60), in adverbials give the duration of accomplishments and for adverbials give 
the duration of processes and states, as in (5a-c). The take time construction in (5d) 
also gives the duration of an accomplishment. 
 
(5) a. This program processed the data in five minutes. 
 b. Jones strolled about for half an hour. 
 c. The window was open for ten minutes. 
 d. This program took five minutes to process the data. 
 
The take and in frames differ slightly in pragmatic emphasis, in that (5a) is 
more compatible with the program being considered quick, and (5d) is more 
compatible with the program being considered slow.  
 
If in adverbials modify canonical achievements, considered to be non-
durative, the statement is interpreted as expressing the delay before the event 
occurred, as in (6a). An in adverbial modifying a state or process is commonly 
anomalous, but may also be interpreted as the delay before the onset of the 
event, as in (6b). 
 
(6) a. She noticed the marks in five minutes. 
 b. The room was completely dark in an hour. 
 
 
5.2 Process, progressives and duration 
 
In addition to the basic process predicates such as chat, stroll about, knit, and 
so on which combine with a for adverbial in their simple tenses, I shall assume 
that accomplishment predicates in the progressive form denote the processes 
of which the events mainly consist, excluding only the moment of 
culmination. Progressives as process-denoters combine in the expected way 
with for adverbials, as in (7a). The statement of duration of an 
accomplishment entails a statement of duration for its component process – 
(7b) and (7c) entail (7a).5 
 
(7) a. This program was processing the data for five minutes. 
 b. This program processed the data in five minutes. 
 c. This program took five minutes to process the data. 
 
Given the relationship between processes, duration and the progressives of 
telic predicates, the progressives of achievement predicates are expected to be 
anomalous, on the assumption that achievements are momentaneous (see 
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  The entailment is sensitive to the scalar implicatures found with cardinal numbers, in this case that 
the interval stated is the maximum. (7b) and (7c) strictly also entail all the statements of the form 
'was processing the data for one/two/three minutes'. 
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Piñón 1997 and references cited there). Being momentaneous, achievements 
have neither component processes nor duration. This observation is supported 
by a contrast in the acceptability of time point predications, illustrated below. 
 
(8) a. He realized the significance of her remarks in a split second. 
  b.   # He was realizing the significance of her remarks for a split  
   second. 
 
Adverbials of momentaneous occurrence such as in a split second are 
sometimes cited as evidence for the non-durativeness of achievements, as in 
(8a). Such adverbials have the form of expressing duration, but express a 
single moment. I propose that the contrast between (8a) and (8b) indicates that 
in adverbials do not literally express duration. Rather, the literal meaning of 
such statements is that the event occurred by the end of the stated interval, and 
the duration reading follows by implicature, assuming that the most 
informative interpretation of such a statement is that the stated interval is the 
minimum interval within which the event occurred. This is compatible with 
the delayed onset reading found with in adverbials applied to states and 
processes as in (6b) above. Because of the distributivity of atelic predicates, 
even if the whole of an atelic event does not fall within the stated interval, an 
event of the kind described does fall within it, so long as the whole event 
begins within the interval.6 A telic predicate, on the other hand, describes the 
event as including its culmination, and so an event of the kind described does 
not fall within the stated interval unless the whole event is contained in it, 
which gives the usual total duration reading for accomplishments. Even so, a 
duration implicature is available only if the event is durative. 
 
A process predicate (including progressives of accomplishments) with a for 
adverbial gives the duration of an event in a different way, by direct 
measurement of the 'constituent event matter'. The difference can be compared 
to two ways of describing physical volume. The in adverbial is comparable to 
saying that a portion of milk fits in a one-litre jar, with the Quantity 
implicature that it fits with no room to spare. The for adverbial is comparable 
to saying that the milk comprises one litre of fluid. The real-world information 
conveyed is the same, but the statements are not literally identical. Returning 
to the contrast in (8), I conclude that achievements can be indirectly said to 
have duration or total size, albeit zero duration, by being described as fitting 
exactly in a time point. But they cannot be converted into constituent event 
matter for measurement because they have no process component. 
                                                          
6
  An anonymous referee points out that it is also important that an atelic event doesn't end within 
the interval of an in adverbial. This is certainly so in The room was dark in an hour, but I am not 
sure whether any particular account, apart from inference based on world knowledge, is required. 
I note here also that the onset delay reading of in adverbials is available for all aktionsart with the 
future tense: 
(i) John will drive to the mall in an hour.  accomplishment 
(ii) Maria will notice the smell in a minute.  achievement 
(iii) The children will be hungry in an hour.  state 
(iv) The children will watch TV in a few minutes. process 
The diagnostic is more reliable with past tense sentences. 
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I have said that a for adverbial expresses a measure on a process, including the 
component process of an accomplishment denoted by the progressive. 
Measurement of component process by a for adverbial can be used to 
distinguish the component processes of accomplishments from the preliminary 
circumstances of a culmination achievement, also denoted by the progressive. 
First, the preliminary circumstance progressive is illustrated in (9b,c) below, 
contrasted with a component process progressive in (9a). Conjoined with a 
future clause apparently describing the same event, the preliminary 
circumstances progressives in (9b,c) must be interpreted as futurative. 
Preliminary circumstances at speech time are compatible with the event itself 
being in the future. The accomplishment progressive in (9a) is interpreted as 
denoting a component process at speech time, which clashes with the future 
predication on the whole event in the second clause. 
 
(9) a.   # He is building a garden shed right now and will probably build 
it this afternoon. 
 b. He is reaching the summit now and will certainly reach it 
before the other climbers. 
 c. The flight is now arriving at Gate 10 and will arrive in one 
minute. 
 
The preliminary circumstance progressive of an achievement predicate is 
incompatible with a for adverbial as shown in (10b) below, although the 
period of imminent occurrence is measurable, as in (10a). 
 
(10) a. He was about to reach the gate for several seconds. 
 b.    # He was reaching the gate for several seconds. 
 
Finally, Mittwoch (1991, p. 76-7) notes that the 'forward-looking' sense of the 
progressive with some achievement predicates is excluded with continuative 
still and in the complement to aspectual verbs such as stop, continue, and 
start, as illustrated in (11). These aspectual modifications are well-formed 
with process progressives – that is, the progressives of activity and 
accomplishment predicates. Note that (11b) has a well-formed reading with 
concessive still, roughly 'Bates was about to reach the gate nevertheless', but is 
anomalous on the temporally continuative reading relevant here; similarly for 
(11d). 
 
(11) a.    # She started reaching the summit just after noon. 
 b.    # Despite sniper fire, Bates was still reaching the gate. 
 c.    # Despite sniper fire, Bates continued reaching the gate. 
 d.    # The flight is still arriving at Gate 10. 
 e.    # The flight continued arriving at Gate 10. 
 
To sum up, in adverbials literally express the containment of an event in an 
interval, with the duration reading provided by implicature. A for adverbial, 
on the other hand, directly measures component process or 'event matter'. Not 
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all progressives denote component processes – progressives which do not 
denote component processes include the interpretive progressive and the 
preliminary circumstances progressive. Non-process progressives are 
distinguished from the component process progressive by for modification, 
still modification and construction with such verbs as stop and continue. 
 
The next section applies these diagnostics to predicates in the host-parasite 
relation. 
 
 
6. HOSTS, PARASITES, DURATION AND PROCESS 
 
As stated above, I assume that with the predicates of interest here the host and 
parasite to some extent co-occur. Criterion parasites, associated with the 
in+interpretive progressive frame, have the same interval of occurrence as the 
host. This is consistent with König's claim that an interpretive progressive is 
evaluated at the same interval as the clause whose denotatum it redescribes. 
Causative upshot parasites, like perlocutions, include a caused effect which 
may be delayed after the causative action, and so the host and parasite may 
have different intervals of occurrence. Nevertheless, if the caused outcome 
develops gradually over the course of the causative action, the host and 
parasite largely overlap in time. It is shown in this section that, despite the 
partial or complete temporal overlap, hosts and parasites occupy the shared 
time differently. 
 
 
6.1 Criterion predicates 
 
 The assumption that a criterion parasite shares its interval of occurrence with 
the host is supported by (12). The host–parasite relation is established in 
(12a), and the duration of the host event is reported in (12b). Both the in 
adverbial and the take construction in (12c,d) give the total duration for the 
criterion parasite mistake-making, based on the host limerick-reciting, rather 
than expressing delay; neither (12c) nor (12d) is interpreted as saying that 
Jones made a mistake at the end of fifteen seconds.  
 
(12) a. In reciting the limerick Jones was making a dreadful mistake. 
 b. It took Jones just fifteen seconds to recite the limerick. 
 c. It took Jones just fifteen seconds to make a dreadful mistake. 
 d. In just fifteen seconds Jones made a dreadful mistake. 
 
In short, make a mistake takes duration modification, and the mistake-making 
event is durative. Generally, as in (7) above, actual duration implies a 
component process measurable by a for adverbial, but as shown in (13a) 
below, the parasite predicate lacks measurable process. The host event, in 
contrast, has a measurable process as in (13b).  
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(13) a.   # Jones was making a mistake for just fifteen seconds. 
 b. Jones was reciting the limerick for just fifteen seconds. 
 
The host and parasite also differ in aspectual modifications which target a 
component process, as in (14) below. The aspectual modifications are fine 
with the host event in (14a,b), but anomalous with the parasite event as in 
(14c,d). Note that (14c) is fine on the concessive reading, irrelevant here. 
 
(14) a. He is still reciting the limerick. 
 b. Despite catcalls, Jones continued reciting the limerick. 
 c.   # He is still making a dreadful mistake. 
 d.   # Despite catcalls, Jones continued making a dreadful mistake. 
  
I conclude that although the parasite shares the interval of occurrence with its 
host, and is not idealized to a moment, it does not have any component 
process. Non-zero duration is not sufficient for internal structure.7 
 
Similar effects are illustrated for criterion break his promise in (15) below. 
The host-parasite pairing is expressed in (15a), and (15b,b') shows that both 
predicates can be modified for whole duration. The contrasts in (15c-e') show 
that the parasite break his promise, unlike the host read the letter, resists 
modification targeting the component process. 
 
(15) a. In reading the letter he was breaking his promise. 
 b. It took him five minutes to read the letter. 
 b'. It took only five minutes to break his promise. 
 c. He continued/stopped reading the letter. 
 c'.   # He continued/stopped breaking his promise. 
 d. He is still reading the letter. 
 d'.   # He is still breaking his promise. 
 e. He was reading the letter for five minutes. 
 e'    #. He was breaking his promise for five minutes. 
 
In addition to the 'proposition match' predicates here, there are criterion 
predicates which lexicalize the host, such as miscount, hosted by count, and 
typecast, hosted by cast, as illustrated in (16) below. For the count/miscount 
examples, assume that a single counting which came out wrong is reported, 
and that a particular error in the course of counting was not detected. Note that 
the anomalous examples are fine on the iterated reading, irrelevant here. 
 
                                                          
7
 The interpretive progressive can appear alone, in which case it may give the appearance of a 
frame progressive. As Jones declaims the first line I can say to him (i), which looks like the 
frame progressive in (ii).  I propose that (i) is actually an interpretive progressive with the 
reading in (iii). The overt frame progressive in (iv) is odd.  
 
(i) You're making a mistake. 
(ii) You're talking too loudly. 
(iii) In doing what you are currently doing you are making a mistake. 
(iv)  ?? He was making a mistake (i.e. reciting the limerick) when she entered the room. 
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(16) a. He is still counting the votes. 
 a'.   # He is still miscounting the votes. 
 b. He was counting the votes for three hours. 
 b'.   # He was miscounting the votes for three hours. 
 c. She is still casting the play. 
 c'.   # She is still typecasting the play. 
 d. She was casting the play for two weeks. 
 d'.   # She was typecasting the play for two weeks. 
 
Although count the votes is telic, the criterion which makes the count a miscount is 
its wrongness, which isn't dependent on the count being complete. Similarly with 
typecast – although cast the play is telic, the criterion that establishes typecasting is 
the style of matching players to roles, which is not dependent on the casting being 
completed. As shown below, these predicates are odd with both in and for 
adverbials, so according to the diagnostics their telicity is indeterminate. 
 
(17) a.   # He miscounted the votes in/for two hours. 
 b.   # She typecast the play in/for two weeks. 
 
Ryle's quasi-dual migrate (and emigrate, immigrate; also his achievements 
misspell, miscalculate) belong here. For migrate, the host is a journey and the 
criterion is that it instantiates a change of habitat. We can say The swallow 
continued flying south (into the rising wind), but not The swallow continued 
migrating, except in the irrelevant iterative sense. 
 
 
6.2 Criterion predicates with complex hosts 
 
So far, I have considered  'proposition match' criterion parasites with examples 
in which the criterion specifies a single action, and accordingly, a specific host 
realizes the parasite definitively – Jones promised not to read the letter, and 
once he has read the letter, he has broken his promise. If he had promised to 
read the letter, once he had read the letter he would have kept his promise. 
 
But a promise doesn't always specify a particular single action. It may specify 
a series of actions, as in (18a) below, or it may specify the absence of a type of 
action, as in (18b). For both (18a) and (18b), promise-keeping can be reported 
as in (18c), with what appears to be a process progressive. In this section I 
argue that (18c) is actually not a process progressive. 
 
(18) a. Jones promised to drink a pint of milk every day. 
 b. Jones promised not to drink alcohol. 
 c. Jones continued keeping his promise for five months. 
 
Consider first the issue of a promise specifying multiple events, as in (18a). 
For ease of discussion, I confine the scope of the promise to a specific period 
as in (19a) below. Supposing that Jones kept his promise, (19b) is true, and 
said about times during June, (19c) is true. 
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(19) a. Jones promised to drink a pint of milk every day during June. 
 b. Jones drank a pint of milk every day during June. 
 c. Jones continued keeping his promise. 
 
The issue at hand is the nature of the progressive in (19c). The interpretation 
of this progressive depends on the structure of the host-parasite relationship. 
Overall, there is one promise, which specifies 30 milk-drinkings, and 
presumably the event of keeping the promise is the sum event of the 30 milk-
drinkings. In other words, the sum event of the 30 milk-drinkings hosts a 
single promise-keeping event. If this is the only pairing of milk-drinking host 
with promise-keeping parasite, then the progressive in (19c) should denote an 
internal part of a single promise-keeping event, and so it would appear to be a 
process progressive. 
 
But in addition to being kept overall, the promise can be said to be kept on a 
daily basis. Each milk-drinking has the property of complying with the 
promise8, and as the examples in (20) illustrate, promise-keepings can be said 
to occur individually on particular days. (20a) is true just in case Jones drank a 
pint of milk on Monday and Wednesday, but not on Tuesday; similarly for 
(20b).  
 
(20) a. Jones kept his promise on Monday and Wednesday (but broke  
it on Tuesday). 
 b. Jones has kept his promise today. 
 
Distributive quantification with every (see Vendler 1967, p. 70-96) also shows 
that individual daily milk-drinkings host individual daily promise-keepings, as 
shown in (21). Given the promise, each milk-drinking hosts a promise-
keeping.  
 
 (21) 'Jones promised to drink a pint of milk every day' entails  
Jones drank a pint of milk every day ↔ Jones kept his promise every 
day 
 
I conclude that where a promise specifies a series of actions, each event in 
fulfilment of the promise has the property of being a promise-keeping, 
although none of them is the promise-keeping event. The (total) promise-
keeping event reported in Jones kept his promise, without adverbials 
indicating particular days, is the sum event consisting of 30 host-parasite 
pairings.  
 
I return now to the progressive in (19c), Jones continued keeping his promise. 
Given that each milk-drinking hosts a promise-keeping, the progressive in 
(19c) denotes part of a series of promise-keeping events, rather than a single 
                                                          
8
 Strictly, the promise is kept every time he drinks the first pint of milk on a given day, and any 
subsequent milk-drinking on the same day is irrelevant to the promise. 
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promise-keeping in progress. The progressive in (19c), then, is a progressive 
of iterated events.  
 
The progressive of iterated events occurs with predicates that otherwise resist 
the process progressive, as illustrated in (22) below. In (22a), iterated degree 
augmentation allows the progressive of stative know, and in (22b) iteration 
allows the progressive of canonical achievement discover. 
 
(22) a. Jones is knowing more and more daily. 
  b. Jones is constantly discovering webpages for lunatics. 
 
Now consider negatively specified promises as in (23) below. 
 
(23) Jones promised not to drink alcohol for three months. 
 
First, in the context of the promise being given, Jones kept his promise entails 
Jones didn't drink alcohol for three months, but the converse, that Jones didn't 
drink alcohol for three months entails Jones kept his promise, is more open to 
question. 
 
For illustration, I assume the analysis of negation in Zucchi and White (1996, 
p. 338): "an event of John's not arriving is an e such that, for some time t, e is 
the fusion of all events that occur at subintervals of t and e does not contain an 
event of John's arriving as a part." Then Jones didn't drink alcohol for three 
months denotes an eventuality e which is the fusion of all events that occur at 
subintervals of a given three-month interval, and e does not contain an event 
of Jones' drinking alcohol as a part. This definition includes scenarios in 
which, immediately after making the promise, Jones is injured and spends 
three months in hospital, without any access to alcohol, or alternatively, he is 
marooned without supplies on a desert island. In these cases, although it is 
certainly true that he didn't drink alcohol for three months, it is open to 
question that he kept his promise. Because he had no opportunity to break his 
promise, we might say that the issue of keeping it or breaking it did not arise, 
or at most, that he kept it inadvertently.9  
 
In contrast, where Jones actively refrained from drinking alcohol for three 
months, declining invitations to bars and choosing fruit juice at parties, there 
is no question that he kept his promise. But in addition to the negative 
description Jones didn't drink alcohol for three months, this scenario can also 
be reported in Jones constantly refrained from drinking alcohol for three 
months, a description which cannot apply to the desert island or hospital 
scenarios.  
 
Bearing in mind the distinction drawn here, between the simple absence of 
events of a given kind and repeated acts of refraining on the other, I return 
                                                          
9
  I note also that according to the definition here, an event of Jones' not drinking alcohol may occur 
at an interval in which Jones dies near the beginning of the interval. In this case my intuition is that 
we cannot say he kept his promise inadvertently, only that the issue didn't arise at all. 
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now to the chief point at issue, the interpretation of the progressives in (24) 
below. 
 
(24) a. Jones continued keeping his promise for three months.10 
 b. Jones was still keeping his promise. 
 
In the context of Jones actively refraining from drinking alcohol, (24a) and 
(24b) are both fine. But both are anomalous as reports of Jones' non-drinking 
in the hospital or desert island scenarios.  
 
I conclude that the progressives in (24) in the active refraining scenario denote 
part of a series of refraining actions, each one hosting a promise-keeping. 
Note that an individual abstaining act can be described as a promise-keeping: 
In declining an invitation to cocktails/in choosing fruit juice yesterday Jones 
was keeping his promise. Where a negatively specified promise is weakly 
fulfilled by the mere absence of events of a certain kind, there is no series of 
individual promise-keepings, and the iterated event progressive is anomalous. 
The iterated event progressives here are not counter-examples to the general 
claim that these predicates lack process progressives. 
  
 
6.3 Causative upshots 
 
As noted in section 4.2, the characteristic frame expressing the relation between 
parasite and host for causative upshots is the by locution. In contrast to criterion 
predicates, the causative parasite is not realized simply in the occurrence of the one 
action performed, but requires also a consequential upshot. Given this difference, 
the causative action treat with iron tonics in (25) below does not include the upshot 
required in cure the patient: the host for cure the patient is the combination of 
treating and consequential recovering. But assuming that Jones' administering 
treatment and Harris' gradual recovery were concurrent, the parasite occurs over the 
same interval as the causative action, or at least at a largely overlapping interval, 
which is sufficient for the data here. 
 
(25) Jones gradually cured Harris of anaemia in four months by treating him with 
iron tonics. 
 
Both the causing action by Jones and the caused recovery of Harris can be 
expressed as measurable processes, as in (26a) and (26b), but the curing cannot, as 
in (26c). 
 
(26) a. Jones was treating Harris with iron tonics for four months. 
 b. Harris was recovering for four months. 
 c.    # Jones was curing Harris of anaemia for four months.11 
                                                          
10
 With these examples, the possibility arises that a control sense of continue requires an agentive 
sense of keep his promise, excluding the inadvertent promise-keepings outlined above. But the 
contrast claimed here is also found in (24b) with still, where control or raising senses of aspectual 
verbs are not involved. 
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Aspectual modification with still and aspectual verbs shows the same contrast: 
They are acceptable with treat and recover, as in (27a) and (27b), but not with cure, 
as in (27c). 
 
(27) a. Jones is still treating Harris with iron tonics. 
  Harris is still recovering from anaemia. 
 b. Jones continued treating Harris with iron tonics. 
  Harris continued recovering from anaemia. 
 c.    # Jones is still curing Harris of anaemia. 
        # Jones continued curing Harris of anaemia. 
 
Again, an event predicate which is compatible with protracted duration cannot form 
a component process progressive. The same effects are found with Austin's 
perlocution convince, also cited as an upshot achievement by Ryle, as illustrated in 
(28). 
 
(28) a. Jones continued presenting the evidence to Harris. 
       # Jones continued convincing Harris. 
 b. Jones was presenting the evidence to Harris for an hour. 
       # Jones was convincing Harris for an hour. 
 
Perhaps unexpectedly, by aspectual criteria kill also belongs in this group, as 
illustrated in (29). Suppose that Jones killed Harris by beating him over the head, 
and that it took Jones ten minutes to kill Harris. The causative action beat has a 
process progressive as in (29a,b), but kill cannot, as in (29c,d). 
 
(29) a. Jones was beating Harris for ten minutes. 
 b. Jones continued beating Harris. 
 c.   # Jones was killing Harris for ten minutes. 
 d.   # Jones continued killing Harris. 
 
 
6.4 Durative achievements 
 
Sections 6.1-6.3 explored the aspectual properties of certain predicates, selected on 
the basis of Ryle's discussion of the spuriously dual nature of an action and its 
upshot. The data show that these predicates have a combination of properties which 
are apparently not accommodated in a Vendlerian classification.  
 
Generally they are compatible with in adverbials, which indicates that they are telic. 
The exceptions are miscount and typecast, which have indeterminate telicity. Where 
an in adverbial is acceptable, it has an event duration reading, showing that the 
denoted events are durative. But duration notwithstanding, these predicates cannot 
form a progressive denoting a component process. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
11
 Ryle suggests that cure can be used in a process sense: 'a doctor may boast that he is curing his 
patient's pneumonia, when his treatment does not in fact result in the anticipated recovery' (p. 143). I 
concur with Mittwoch (1991, p. 83, fn. 3) in disputing this point. 
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I claim that the lack of a component process progressive is the essential 
characteristic of these predicates, and that it identifies them as achievements. 
 
There are two main objections to classing these predicates as achievements. First, 
canonical achievements are momentary, as in Piñòn (1997) and references cited 
there. Second, canonical achievements are non-agentive: they cannot be modified 
by adverbs such as deliberately, nor appear in the complement to verbs such as 
decide and persuade. The predicates at issue vary in compatibility with agentive 
contexts. Although cure is anomalous with deliberately, keep/break his promise 
and others are fully agentive. 
 
On the first point, the intuition that the denoted event lacks duration is not the 
primary diagnostic by which a predicate is classified as an achievement predicate. 
The chief diagnostic for an achievement predicate is the lack of a process 
progressive. Focussing on the most familiar achievement predicates, such as 
discover, find, spot, and so on, the observation that these predicates denote 
momentary events provides an explanation for the lack of a process progressive – a 
zero-dimensional event cannot have a process. I concur with this view. But in 
principle, zero-dimensionality of the denoted event is not the only possible reason 
for an event predicate to lack a process progressive. Sections 7 and 8 below give an 
account of the lack of a process progressive with the predicates at issue. 
 
On the second point, the relationship between the thematic property of agentivity 
and aspectual classification is complex. Despite general correlations between non-
agentivity and states and canonical achievements, overall (non-)agentivity does not 
coincide exactly with aspectual classes. For example, Dowty (1979, p. 184) 
concludes that all four of Vendler's classes have both agentive and non-agentive 
members. Nevertheless, canonical achievements such as arrive and discover are 
strongly non-agentive. 
 
Piñòn (1997, p. 281) attributes the non-agentivity of canonical achievements to 
their lack of duration. He writes: "Intuitively, it is reasonable to think that any sort 
of intentional activity or act takes time, if only a short time. Since instantaneous 
eventualities have zero duration, they lack the temporal extent required for 
intentional activity." As we have seen, the predicates at issue in this paper are not 
durationless, and so the possibility of agentivity is left open. 
 
To conclude, I have identified a class of predicates which denote durative events 
but lack a process progressive. I take the lack of a process progressive to be criterial 
for achievements, and shall term these predicates durative achievements. Durative 
achievements and momentary achievements share the criterial property of lacking a 
process progressive. Momentary achievements have no process progressive because 
a component process cannot occur in a zero-dimensional event. In addition, 
adopting Piñòn's view, a zero-dimensional event cannot have an agent. Durative 
achievements, on the other hand, are sufficiently complex to allow for agentivity. 
The lack of a process progressive with criterion predicates is addressed in the next 
section. Process progressives and causative upshots are discussed in section 8. 
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7. CRITERION PREDICATES, STAGE-LEVEL AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
PREDICATES ON EVENTS 
 
In this section I shall argue that criterion predicates are individual-level predicates 
on events, and that this explains their lack of process progressives. I review stage-
level and individual-level predication in the next two sections,  and emphasise the 
central property relevant here, that stage-level predication with respect to a 
particular argument selects a temporal part of that argument, while individual-level 
predication predicates of the argument entity as a whole. In sections 7.3 and 7.4 I 
argue that the event argument of an event predicate is also subject to the 
stage/individual distinction, and show that the process progressive is a predicate on 
a temporal part of the event argument, hence a stage-level predicate on the event. 
Criterion predicates as individual-level predicates on events are reviewed in section 
7.5.  
 
 
7.1 State descriptions and properties; stage-level and individual-level 
predicates; thetic and categorical propositions 
 
Milsark (1977: 12-13) drew attention to the difference between what he called 
state-descriptive predicates, which denote 'states, conditions in which an entity 
finds itself and which are subject to change without there being any essential 
alteration of the entity', and property predicates, which 'denote what might be called 
properties of the entities of which they are predicated'. Property predicates 'are 
descriptions which name some trait possessed by the entity and which is assumed to 
be more or less permanent, or at least to be such that some significant change in the 
character of the entity will result if the description is altered'. Milsark showed that 
property predicates require strong NPs as subjects, while state-descriptive 
predicates take both weak and strong subjects. 
 
Carlson (1977) analyses the distinction as a difference between predicate types, 
selecting different types of argument as subject. He draws on long-standing 
observations about the metaphysical difficulties of identifying a concrete individual 
over time: "Heraclitus noted that a person cannot step in the same river twice, for 
the river (as well as the person) is not, in terms of its physical composition, the 
same from one instant to the next" (Carlson 1977: 110-1). Carlson argues that the 
whole individual is made up of spatio-temporal stages, and it is these spatio-
temporal stages which participate in events and episodes such as those reported in 
She hit a home run or She was hungry. The individual as a whole is the bearer of 
non-episodic properties like those predicated in She is tall or She looks like a 
chipmunk. Accordingly, Carlson analysed state-descriptive predicates as stage-level 
predicates, taking stages of individuals as arguments, and property predicates as 
individual-level predicates, taking whole individuals as arguments. Even where 
Carlson's formal analysis is not adopted, as Ladusaw (1994: 221) comments, his 
terminology for the distinction has become standard.  
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Carlson uses the distinction he draws to account for the different interpretation of 
indefinite singular NPs and bare plurals. As illustrated in (30) below, an indefinite 
subject is interpreted existentially with a stage-level predicate (available) and 
generically with an individual-level predicate (intelligent). 
 
(30) a. A doctor is available.  
  'There is a doctor available.' 
 a'. Doctors are available. 
  'There are some doctors available.' 
 b. A doctor is intelligent. 
 b'. Doctors are intelligent. 
  Doctors in general are (typically) intelligent. 
 
In Carlson's analysis a kind is a sort of individual, and an indefinite NP is 
interpreted as denoting a kind to satisfy the selectional restrictions of an individual-
level predicate. 
 
Ladusaw (1994) argues that stage-level and individual-level predicates correlate 
with thetic and categorical judgments (or propositions), taken originally from 
Brentano (1874, 1924) and developed by Kuroda (1972, 1992). In a categorical, or 
double, judgment, an entity is presented to the attention and then a property is 
attributed to it. In a thetic or single judgment, a state of affairs is simply presented 
'all at once', and the participants are included as part of the presented state of 
affairs. Ladusaw argues that property predications (i.e. with individual-level 
predicates) are categorical, and this is why they must have strong NP subjects, 
including generics – the presentation of an entity as subject of a categorical 
judgment requires a strong NP, with the 'presuppositional' character that such NPs 
express. A thetic judgment, on the other hand, simply presents an eventuality. The 
existence of this eventuality is asserted directly, but the existence of any 
participants in the eventuality is asserted only indirectly, insofar as the occurrence 
of the event requires them to be involved.12 Ladusaw proposes (p. 224) that an 
indefinite argument in a thetic judgment (with a stage-level predicate) is interpreted 
as a description restricting a parameter in the eventuality description. Then the 
existential reading of the indefinite NP stems from existential closure over the 
event, also obliquely entailing the existence of a participant satisfying the indefinite 
description. 
 
Under Ladusaw's proposal, the correlation of individual-level predicates with 
strong subjects (including generic indefinites), and stage-level predicates with 
existential indefinites, is not a basic property of the predicates, but is derived from 
the kind of proposition the predicates appear in. The basic difference, from which 
the restrictions on NP forms and interpretations follow, is that between predicating 
a property of an entity, and asserting the existence of an eventuality (with or 
without independent reference to the participants). 
 
                                                          
12
  Strictly, the existence of a participant denoted by an indefinite NP is only indirectly entailed as 
described. A sentence expressing a thetic judgment may contain a strong NP, in which case the 
existence of the entity may be directly entailed by the interpretation of the NP. 
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Ladusaw emphasises the contrast between the presuppositional interpretation of 
subjects of individual-level predicates, and the existential interpretation of 
indefinite subjects of stage-level predicates. The thetic/categorical difference also 
correlates with the temporal distinction in interpreting arguments emphasised by 
Milsark and Carlson. An individual-level predicate in a categorical proposition not 
only takes the subject as 'given' or 'presupposed', but also characterizes the entity in 
a non-eventive or non-episodic way. No particular spatio-temporal location apart 
from that of the bearer of the predicated property can be inferred. Although the 
existence of entities such as people and concrete objects is in fact located in time 
and space, the subject of an individual-level predicate is not presented as spatially 
or temporally located. We can infer temporal limits from an individual-level 
predication. For example, Robespierre was a lawyer predicates a property which 
was true of Robespierre from the time he qualified or began practice, but not during 
his childhood, while Saint-Just had blue eyes predicates a property which was true 
of Saint-Just from the time his eyes formed in the womb. However, our knowledge 
of these temporal limits on the property-bearing comes from world knowledge, and 
the temporal limits are not part of the truth conditions of the predicating sentences. 
An individual-level predicate attributes a property to an entity 'as a whole'. 
 
A stage-level predicate in a thetic proposition, on the other hand, reports an event, 
located in time and space. The entities involved in the event, arguments of the 
predicate, are presented as located in time and space with respect to their 
participation in the event, though the actual existence of the participant entities 
commonly extends beyond the event. To the extent that a stage-level predicate 
predicates on a participant entity, it predicates on a temporal part of the whole 
entity, or more accurately, on a dated realization of an entity which is part of a 
potentially more extensive entity. This contrast, between predicating of an entity as 
a whole and predicating of an entity as a temporal part of a potentially more 
extensive entity, remains central to individual-level and stage-level predication, and 
will be discussed further below. 
 
 
7.2 Stage-level and individual-level are relativized to arguments 
 
The association between categorical judgments and individual-level predicates also 
serves to clarify another issue. A categorical judgment has two parts, the subject 
and the predicated property. If the predicate is intransitive (John is intelligent), the 
subject is the only argument and so by default the predicate is individual-level for 
all its arguments. However, a transitive predicate may be individual-level for the 
subject and stage-level for the object, as illustrated in (31) below.13 
 
(31) Beavers build dams. 
 
The proposition attributes a dispositional or habitual property to the kind of 
beavers, and is individual-level for the subject. But the object dams is existentially 
interpreted, and this is like the existential interpretations of indefinites in thetic 
                                                          
13
  Carlson (1979, p. 289-95) analyses (31) and related examples, raised in Chomsky (1975). 
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propositions. The property of being a dam-builder rests in some sense on the actual 
or potential existence of dam-building events.14 Setting aside for the moment the 
actual or potential status of such events, (31) can be partly represented by (32). 
 
(32) [Gen x: Beaver(x)] ∃e,y (Dam(y) & Build(x,y,e)) 
 
Pragmatic considerations and world knowledge constrain the interpretation of the 
generic quantifier Gen, determining in this case how many beavers must build dams 
to warrant predicating the dam-building property of the kind. Given a contextual 
interpretation for Gen, for each of a number of beavers the existence of dam-
buildings is asserted. This assertion is thetic in character, and the existence of a dam 
for each dam-building is only obliquely entailed as part of the event. With respect 
to dams the predication is stage-level. 
 
The important point to note here is that a predicate need not be stage-level or 
individual-level tout court. The stage-level and individual-level classifications are 
relativized to the arguments of a predicate. If a predicate has more than one 
argument it may be stage-level for one and individual-level for another.15 
 
 
7.3 The event argument 
 
The distinction between stage-level and individual-level predicates as reviewed so 
far is primarily a distinction between eventive and non-eventive predicates. 
Focussing on this point,  Kratzer (1988/1996) argues that stage-level predicates, 
being episodic or eventive, have a Davidsonian event argument which individual-
level predicates lack.16 The event variable can be bound by quantification, which 
accounts for the difference in acceptability between (33a) and (33b) below 
(Kratzer's (15a,d), (15'a,d), p. 129-30). Briefly, the universal quantification 
expressed by when must bind a variable in both clauses of the logical form. In 
(33a), Mary and French are names, and the individual-level predicate knows has no 
event variable, so there is no free variable for the quantifier to bind and the sentence 
is anomalous. In (33b), however, the stage-level predicate speaks introduces an 
event variable (l for spatio-temporal location) which is bound by the quantifier, 
accounting for the well-formedness of the sentence and the interpretation 'Every 
event/occasion of Mary speaking French is an event/occasion of Mary speaking 
French well'. 
 
(33) a.  # When Mary knows French, she knows it well. 
  Always [knows(Mary, French)] [knows-well(Mary, French)] 
 b. When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well. 
  Always [speaks(Mary, French, l)] [speaks-well(Mary, French, l)] 
                                                          
14
  The relationship between dispositional and habitual predication and the existence of events of the 
kind described is extremely complex – see Krifka et al. (1995) and references cited there for 
discussion. 
15
  See also Eckardt (1998, p. 151-2) for related observations. 
16
 For Kratzer, given that a predicate either does or does not have an event argument, the stage-level 
or individual-level classification is not relativized to or defined in terms of participant arguments. 
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I shall assume a Davidsonian event argument for all event predicates, and accept 
Kratzer's view that predicates with an event argument are stage-level for the 
participant arguments. It follows that all the predicates I have identified as criterion 
predicates, such as make a mistake, break a promise and miscount, are stage-level 
for the participant arguments. The discussion in section 6 above shows that they 
share some of the temporal properties of the events which host them, and Kratzer's 
analysis of quantificational when-clauses also indicates that these predicates have 
an event variable, as illustrated in (34) below, which is well-formed and has the 
interpretation 'Every event/occasion of John's miscounting is an event/occasion of 
his miscounting badly'. 
 
(34) When John miscounts, he miscounts badly.  
 Always [miscount(John, l)] [miscount-badly(John, l)] 
 
The point I pursue here is that for all the criterion predicates under consideration, 
the event itself is an argument of the verb. The inclusion of an event argument 
raises the issue of how such predicates are classified with respect to the event itself. 
I have argued in section 7.2 above that stage-level and individual-level 
classifications are relativized to arguments, and a predicate may be stage-level for 
one argument but individual-level for another. So even though the predicates at 
issue are stage-level for the participant arguments, they may be stage-level or 
individual-level for the event. The next section argues that a process progressive is 
a stage-level predicate for the event. 
 
 
7.4 Process progressives and stage-level predication 
 
For the event argument, the progressive aspect denotes a part or 'time-slice' of a 
potentially more extensive whole event. The notion that the progressive denotes 
part of a larger event is found in almost all descriptions and formal analyses of the 
progressive, particularly those based on Dowty's (1979, p. 149) definition, shown in 
(35), with a gloss added.17 
 
(35) [PROG ϕ] is true at <I, w> iff for some interval I' such that I ⊂ I' and I is 
not a final subinterval for I', and for all w' such that w' ∈ Inr(<I, w>), ϕ is 
true at <I, w'>. 
" A progressive sentence [PROG ϕ] is true at an interval I and a world w if 
and only if for some interval I', such that I is a proper subinterval of I' and I 
is not a final subinterval for I', and for all w' such that w' is a member of the 
set of inertia worlds for I and w, ϕ is true at I' and w'. " 
 
For example, Mary is crossing the street is true at an interval I, a proper and non-
final subinterval of interval I', and at a world w iff Mary cross the street is true at I' 
in all inertia worlds for I and w. An inertia world is a world in which things 
                                                          
17
  An analysis of the progressive as converting an accomplishment predicate to a process, as in 
Moens (1987, 2001, p. 54) is expressed in terms of removing the culmination. I consider that this 
also treats the progressive as denoting part of a potentially larger whole. 
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continue on their present course after the time I denoted by the progressive. The 
intuition is that progressive crossing the street denotes part of a complete street-
crossing, even though the street-crossing spoken of may be interrupted and never 
completed in actuality – Mary is crossing the street is true at a time t even though 
Mary is about to be hit by a car and will never reach the other side. Inertia worlds 
are intended to formalize the notion that, had things continued unfolding as they 
were without the interruption of the car, eventually Mary would have crossed the 
street. The analysis of the modal character of the progressive has been developed 
considerably (see, for example, Asher (1992), but for the present purpose, Dowty's 
definition serves to illustrate the central point, that a process progressive picks out a 
temporal part or time-slice of a larger event, although part of the larger event may 
be unrealized. 
 
Although a modal analysis for the potential continuation of an event denoted by a 
progressive is primarily aimed at dealing with telic predicates, the notion of 
potential continuation also applies to atelic predicates. Briefly, Jones was walking 
is true of a time when, had things continued 'inertially', Jones would have gone on 
walking. 
 
Entailments discussed by Kenny (1963, p. 175), illustrated in (36) below, show that 
the time-slice of an event denoted by a progressive excludes not only the possible 
continuation, but also the initial part of the whole event.18 
 
(36) a. Jones is walking  → Jones has been walking. 
 b. Jones is eating an apple →  Jones has been eating an apple. 
 
To sum up: the process progressive denotes a temporal part of a larger event entity, 
which exists earlier than the part denoted by the progressive, and potentially 
endures beyond it. Accordingly, following the distinction argued for in section 7.1, 
the process progressive is stage-level for the event. In contrast, a simple tensed 
sentence such as Jones ate an apple or Jones will paint the fence denotes an event 
as a whole, and I assume that these predications are individual-level for the event. 
Most event predicates (accomplishments and processes) are freely used in both 
stage-level (process progressive) and individual-level (non-progressive) forms.19 
 
I have said that the process progressive picks out a proper part of a larger 
event. This is particularly evident in examples such as Jones was making 
coffee when Mary arrived, in which the progressive denotes a momentary 
time-slice of the coffee-making event, coincident with the arrival. More needs 
to be said about the progressive with a for adverbial, as in (37a) below, 
repeated from (7) above. Given that (37b) expresses the duration of the whole 
event, it isn't evident that the progressive in (37a) picks out a proper part of 
the event. 
                                                          
18
  The entailments in (36) are subject to considerations of 'grain size' or homogeneity of the denoted 
process: see Taylor (1977) for discussion. 
19
 Carlson (1979, p. 302) observes that only stage-level predicates (in my terms, stage-level for the 
participant arguments), can take the progressive. But event predicates are stage-level for the 
participant arguments in non-progressive forms as well – Jones left is stage-level for the subject. 
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(37) a. This program was processing the data for five minutes. 
 b. This program took five minutes to process the data. 
  
The analysis of the for adverbial is the key here. Along the same lines as 
Dowty (1979, p. 87) and Mittwoch (1988), I assume that a for adverbial 
expresses universal quantification over times in the interval, and that this 
quantification has scope over the event description, as indicated in (38) below.  
 
(38) [∃I: 5 minutes(I)] [∀t: t ∈ I] the program was processing the data at t 
 
Here, what I earlier described as direct measurement of 'event matter' is 
analysed in terms of distributed placement throughout a measured (one-
dimensional) location.20 Within the scope of the for adverbial, the progressive 
denotes times-slices of the event located at points within the interval, and is 
stage-level. 
 
 
7.5 Criterion predicates and properties 
 
What is intrinsically parasitic about criterion predicates, such as make a mistake, 
break a promise, miscount, break the law, and so on, is that the eventualities 
described cannot simply come about, but must be realized in the occurrence of 
some event which is describable in different terms. In the example in section 6.1 
above, Jones' breaking his promise was realized in the event of Jones reciting a 
limerick, and could not have been realized without a limerick-reciting by Jones. But 
the limerick-reciting could have occurred independently, without also being a 
promise-breaking, had Jones not given the relevant promise.  
 
The 'real' or basic event is the host limerick-reciting, and promise-breaking is just a 
property characterizing that event. A simple report Jones broke his promise entails 
the independent existence of an event which had the property of being a promise-
breaking, but could have occurred without having that property, although it could 
not have occurred without being a limerick-reciting. The same relationship appears 
in the property predication Jones is tall. Jones could have been Jones without being 
tall, but his tallness couldn't be instantiated without Jones. 
 
The property-predicating nature of criterion predicates can sometimes be expressed 
transparently in paraphrases such as those in (39) below, with the associated 
Davidsonian representations.  
 
(39) a. Jones broke the law. 
  'Jones did something, and what he did was illegal' 
                                                          
20
 The treatment of measurement as placement throughout a measured location can be 
generalized to measures of mass substances such as a litre of milk, discussed in section 5.2, as 
follows: there is a three-dimensional location with a volume of one litre, and at every point in 
that location there is milk. See Moltmann (1991) for discussion of distributed location and 
measure adverbials. 
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  ∃e (do(j,e) & illegal(e)) 
 b. Jones made a mistake. 
  'Jones did something, and what he did was mistaken' 
  ∃e (do(j,e) & mistaken(e)) 
 c. Jones miscounted. 
  'Jones counted, and what he did was inaccurate' 
  ∃e (count(j,e) & inaccurate(e)) 
 
Isolating the property-predicating component of these predicates clarifies why they 
are individual-level. Explicit comparisons are given in (40) below. Supposing that 
(40a) is true, (40b) is ill-formed as a description of the event, in comparison with 
Jones continued reading the document. The ill-formedness of (40b) is the same as 
the ill-formedness of (40c): (40c) and (40d) are both instances of a process 
progressive with an individual-level predicate. Criterion predicates, then, resist the 
process progressive because they are individual-level for the event, and the process 
progressive is stage-level for the event. 
 
(40) a. In reading the document Jones was breaking the law. 
 b.   # Jones continued breaking the law. 
 c.   # Jones' action continued being illegal. 
 d.   # Jones continued being tall. 
 
With verbal predication on events the event argument is not syntactically projected 
as an NP.21 Consequently, the presuppositional effects underlying restrictions on 
strong and weak NPs as subjects of the property predication do not arise. The only 
correlate of the independence or 'presuppositionality' of the subject of an event 
property predication is the entailed existence of the host as discussed above: the 
parasite depends on the host but not vice versa. 
 
 
8. CAUSATIVE UPSHOT PREDICATES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROCESSES 
 
The host-parasite relation of causative upshots (cure, convince, and possibly kill) is 
quite unlike that of criterion predicates. In section 6.3 I used causative upshot 
predicates paired with 'means' hosts in order to emphasise the contrast in process 
progressives between the causative upshot and the means by which it was brought 
about. 
 
But a causative upshot is not intrinsically parasitic in the way a criterion predicate 
is, as indicated by their different pairing frames: the by frame with a non-
progressive for causative upshots (Jones convinced Harris by showing him the 
evidence), and the in frame with an interpretive progressive for criterion predicates 
(In reciting the limerick Jones was breaking his promise).  
 
                                                          
21
  The event may be projected as an NP in some light verb constructions – see Kearns (1988, 1997) 
and Mittwoch (1998) for discussion. 
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A causative upshot is not a property borne by an event that might have occurred 
without that property. If we identify the host of Jones convinced Harris, for 
example, in the same way as we identify the host for a criterion predicate, the host 
must include not only the showing of evidence but also the caused state of Harris' 
conviction. It is only in the conjunction of the evidence-presenting and the caused 
conviction that what Jones convinced Harris describes is realized. But such an 
event could not occur without being a convincing of Harris by Jones. This contrasts 
with criterion predicates, as noted above: Jones' limerick-reciting is all that is 
needed to realize the promise-breaking, but it could have occurred without being a 
promise-breaking. 
 
So a causative upshot is not a separable property predication on an independently 
identifiable event – rather it is a basic event predicate, denoting a caused change of 
state. 
 
Apart from the process progressive, cure, convince and kill resemble 
accomplishments. They are modifiable by gradually, indicating that the caused 
change of state may come about by degrees. The gradual nature of the caused 
change of state is also evident with almost modification. Dowty (1979, p. 58-9) 
observes that almost has two readings with accomplishments. For example, John 
almost painted a picture may mean that John was about to paint a picture, but 
ultimately didn't, or that he began painting a picture and didn't quite finish it. 
Almost with achievements (John almost noticed the painting) has only the reading 
that John was about to notice the painting but didn't. With kill, almost has both the 
readings noted here, but with cure and convince most naturally has only the reading 
that Dowty considers peculiar to accomplishments. Jones almost cured Harris of 
his prejudices is most naturally understood to mean that Harris was partly but not 
completely cured of his prejudices, not that Jones ultimately did nothing. 
 
In addition, cure, kill, and convince are compatible with in adverbials and the take 
time construction expressing event duration, both considered characteristic of 
accomplishments. 
 
All three verbs, then, denote caused, durative, gradual, telic changes of state. 
Nevertheless, they do not have the inflectional behaviour of accomplishments – the 
process progressive cannot be used to denote a proper part of the event. 
Accordingly, I have classed these predicates as durative achievements. 
 
I tentatively suggest that the difference between accomplishments and causative 
upshots, especially cure and convince, despite their apparent temporal similarities, 
lies in Ryle's notion of upshots as special kinds of outcomes, which are not the 
same as the culminations of accomplishments. 
 
Consider first accomplishments such as cross the street. The denoted event consists 
of a process, which if left to carry on inertially will eventually culminate. Although 
the event of Mary's crossing the street is subject to infinitely many possible 
disruptions, nevertheless, if disruptions external to the event itself, such as speeding 
trucks, heart attacks and so on, are excluded, Mary will get to the other side. In 
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excluding disruptions external to the process in progress, we focus on what Mary is 
doing, or what is happening to Mary. 
 
Consider now a causative upshot like the event of Jones curing Harris. If we focus 
on what Jones is doing, that is, treating Harris with iron tonics, even assuming the 
absence of any interruptions external to the event itself, the upshot of Harris' being 
cured is not in any way an inertial continuation or outcome. This is the point 
emphasised by Ryle which makes a curing lucky or successful. There is no sense in 
which the mere continuation of administering treatment will lead, all else being 
equal, to a cure. 
 
One obvious consequence of this difference is that accomplishments may be 
agentive but cure and convince are non-agentive. I suggest that an additional 
consequence is the aspectual difference between accomplishments and causative 
upshots. An accomplishment predicate denotes an event which is conceived of as a 
process with a natural or inertial culmination, and given the inertial status of the 
culmination, a culminated and unculminated process are still broadly the same kind 
of event. A crossing the street process is just an unfinished cross the street 
accomplishment. Accordingly, both can be denoted by the same predicate stem.  
 
A causative upshot predicate, on the other hand, denotes the causal pairing of an 
action with an upshot that is not an inertial development or culmination of the 
action. The completion or success of the whole event is not inertially related to its 
'in-progress' stages, and so the in-progress stages of such an event are not broadly 
the same kind of event as the complete action+upshot complex. In short, an 
unrealized cure is not any kind of curing event.22 
 
The judgment that a lexicalized outcome (that is, someone is cured or convinced or 
induced to do something) is less inertially given or expected than the completion of 
an event like crossing the street is subject to individual variation. As Ryle 
comments (p. 143), " a doctor may boast that he is curing his patient's pneumonia, 
when his treatment does not in fact result in the anticipated recovery." Austin 
(1962/1975, p. 105ff.) also comments on what he calls the proleptic use of 
perlocutionary verbs such as persuade. We can loosely say I was persuading him 
for hours but he was adamant. However, the difference between persuade and the 
illocutionary verb urge shows up in while he was unsuccessfully urging me /# 
persuading me, where the overt denial of a successful outcome is incompatible with 
the progressive of a perlocutionary verb, one type of causative upshot predicate. 
                                                          
22
  Cure, convince and kill lexicalize definite final endstates – one can be completely or absolutely 
cured, convinced or dead. In this, causative upshots line up with change of state verbs based on 
closed ranges, compared with change of state verbs based on open ranges, such as lengthen or 
shorten – a thing cannot be completely long or completely short. Hay et al. (1999) argue that closed 
range change of state verbs are telic, and that Dowty's (1979, p. 88) degree achievements are based 
on open ranges. The central characteristic of degree achievements is that the non-progressive form 
may be either telic or atelic (The soup cooled in/for five minutes). However, a closed-range base for 
a change of state verb does not bar the possibility of a progressive form denoting a process. Both 
empty and full are closed range adjectives, but Jones continued emptying/filling the sack are fine, as 
are Jones was emptying/filling the sack for five minutes. The type of telicity associated with a 
closed-range base does not account for the lack of a process progressive. 
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The oddness of He was unsuccessfully persuading me contrasts with examples such 
as Mary was crossing the street but never got there, where the denial of a 
culmination does not affect the well-formedness of the process progressive. 
 
I conclude that the contrast between inertial culmination and non-inertial upshot 
determines the distributivity of the event description expressed by a predicate stem. 
For an accomplishment, consisting of a process with an inertial culmination, to say 
that both the (unculminated) process and the completed event are broadly the same 
kind of event is to say that the description expressed by the predicate stem is 
distributive. But the success or upshot component of a causative upshot predicate 
strictly does not distribute to the action which may or may not be crowned with 
success. Consequently, the predicate stem of a causative upshot is not distributive, 
and resists the process progressive. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As above, a wide range of predicates discussed by Ryle show a certain kind of 
semantic complexity which I have called quasi-duality. Ryle's main purpose was to 
argue that the apparent duality of such predicates should not be analysed in terms of 
two events or actions conjoined – such predicates denote a single event, but with an 
'extra' component of predication on that event, generally, what Ryle calls an upshot. 
An upshot is not itself an event or action. 
 
Some predicates express only the upshot, as in Ryle's journey and arrive, where 
journey expresses the event proper and arrive expresses the upshot of that event. 
Although arrive does not express both event and upshot, the predicate may still be 
considered a quasi-dual in that the main event is presupposed. An upshot cannot 
occur without the event of which it is the upshot. The imperfectly eventive 
character of arrive as an upshot predicate is consistent with the view that a 
culmination achievement denotes the final boundary of an event. As boundaries 
presuppose the objects or regions they bound, so a culmination achievement 
presupposes the event it culminates. Pure upshot predicates such as arrive, along 
with onset boundary predicates such as realize and discover, (Piñòn's (1997) right 
and left boundary happenings, respectively) comprise most of the predicates 
generally classed as achievements in a Vendlerian system. Their aspectual 
peculiarity arises out of their lack of temporal extent.  
 
In this paper I have focussed on the more substantial quasi-duals which express 
both the event and the upshot, under two main types, criterion predicates and 
causative upshot predicates. Taking the lack of a process progressive as criterial, I 
have classed them as achievements. Unlike boundary achievements, these 
predicates express both event and upshot, and are durative. I use the term durative 
achievement to distinguish them from momentary achievements. 
 
I have argued that criterion predicates are property predicates on the event as a 
whole, and are thus individual-level for the event. The process progressive is not 
only stage-level for NP arguments, but also for the event argument. Consequently, a 
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predicate which is lexically individual-level for the event is incompatible with the 
process progressive. 
 
Causative upshots are more difficult to evaluate. I have suggested that the 
difference between accomplishments and causative upshots lies in the difference 
between an inertial culmination and an '(un)lucky' upshot. Given the natural or 
inertial character of an accomplishment culmination, the incomplete 
accomplishment process and the complete accomplishment are similar, apart from 
the culmination itself. Accordingly the same predicate stem can denote both part of 
the event and the whole event – the predicate stem is distributive. But given the 
non-inertial character of an upshot, the internal stages of an event of curing or 
convincing are not the same sort of event as the successful whole. The predicate 
stem is not distributive, and cannot form a process progressive. 
 
I conclude with futher tentative remarks concerning stage-level and individual-level 
predicates on NP arguments and on events. As noted above, a stage-level 
predication on an NP argument is eventive or episodic, while an individual-level 
predication on an NP argument, attributing a property to the argument, is not 
eventive or episodic. Given that all predications on an event are eventive by 
definition (that is, they have an event argument), the distinction cannot apply in the 
same way. I suggest that the distinction between stage-level and individual-level 
collapses to some extent for event arguments.  
 
Suppose that 'basic' event predicates such as eat an apple, walk, wake up, and so on 
express event sortal properties. Most such predicates can denote the whole event or 
a temporal part of it, modulo progressive morphology. They are not lexically fixed 
for either stage-level or individual-level predication. Presumably a basic event 
predicate cannot express a distinction which is elsewhere partly based on a contrast 
between events and non-events. In this they differ from sortal predicates for NP 
arguments, as in Jones is a mechanic, which are non-eventive and individual-level. 
I suggest that 'basic' or sortal event predicates are not lexically specified as stage-
level or individual-level for the event argument. The difference between predication 
on a stage and predication on the whole is expressed by aspectual modification, 
including the progressive. Among event sortal predicates, although most are 
distributive, a few, including causative upshots, are non-distributive – the in-
progress stages of such an event are not the same kind of event as the whole event. 
Criterion predicates, however, express descriptive properties of events rather than 
sortal properties. It appears that this difference underlies their behaviour as 
individual-level, property predicates.  
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